LYCOS RETRIEVER 
Nato Enlargement: United States
built 180 days ago
Fears that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will disrupt ties between the United States and Russia are unfounded. Russia needs Western investment, technology, and cooperation to integrate into the global economy. In addition, the Western media overemphasize anti-NATO sentiment among Russians. Polls show that Russians worry more about payments of chronically delayed wages, low living standards, crime, and corruption. Russia's real security concerns... are with its Islamic neighbors and the People's Republic of China, not with the democratic West. Finally, even the Yeltsin administration, which vehemently opposes NATO enlargement, admits that the major threats to Russia are domestic, and that no foreign country currently endangers Russia's security.
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The administration advocated four elements of the pro-enlargement case to the Senate that may have lasting consequences for NATO. First, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright characterized in her testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the three invited members as being prepared for NATO membership, being willing to bear the burden, and having a citizenry who supported the policy. Yet, for example, the State Department's own polling data showed that in Hungary public attitudes were exactly the opposite. In October 1997, some 56 percent of Hungarians opposed sending troops to defend another NATO country if it were attacked; 52 percent opposed stationing NATO troops in Hungary. While NATO has no need or plans to station nuclear weapons in new member states, it is in principle a requirement that they must accept. Yet 96 percent of Hungarians opposed stationing nuclear weapons on their territory.
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Defense program requirements of NATO enlargement are significant because Article 5 commitments require corresponding partner commitments and NATO must avoid hollow political commitments. If NATO enlarges to include the four Visegrad states, it will take about twenty years in steady step-by-step efforts to upgrade new member forces. (It took between 1975-1995 to achieve Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability RSI for NATO forces.) If NATO helps the new members upgrade their forces (at burden sharing rates of 50-50), the first ten-year costs are estimated to be on the order of $35 billion. Because new-member forces were in the Warsaw Pact, they will be difficult to harmonize with NATO. Hence, NATO must aim to operate its forces side-by-side with partners, rather than intermeshing with them. In addition, not only do NATO forces need to be restructured for out- of-area force projection.
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Far from undermining the case for NATO enlargement, the September 11 terrorist attacks make it both more desirable and more feasible. First, NATO's role in the response to those attacks has shown the degree to which the Alliance has evolved since the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was signed. Whereas the original NATO essentially meant the United States took on defense commitments for its European allies, the Alliance can now work the other way around—as the first invocation of Article 5 in 52 years has shown. The political importance of 18 U.S. allies declaring their solidarity with the United States and pledging a range of military assets—even troops—was considerable. The recent experience demonstrates that membership is now a two-way street.
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NATO enlargement advocates won the debate in part by isolating skeptics from the process rather than by listening to expert advice that might have strengthened the policy. Critics as prestigious as former State Department official George Kennan and former Senator Sam Nunn appeared to be dismissed as people who do not understand the issues at hand in Europe. Some opponents of NATO enlargement could never have been brought along to support the policy. However, rather than the administration spending bureaucratic energy discrediting the arguments of respected foreign policy leaders, time would have been better spent engaging them constructively to build a wider base of long-term support for NATO. A more careful hearing of skeptics would have protected the administration and the Alliance against the negative consequences of enlargement that may still be ahead. At the same time, critics of NATO enlargement would have been better served by acknowledging that the policy was not all bad.
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The NATO enlargement, particularly in the light of NATO military actions in Yugoslavia, will definitely affect the process of reductions of nuclear weapons. In the view of NATO's clear superiority in conventional weapons, Russian military and policy makers are leaning to strengthen the role of nuclear weapons. Not coincidentally, after NATO launched its campaign against Yugoslavia, a number of official statements were made that imply possible changes in the Russian nuclear policy. However, further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons are in Russia's interests. Majority of Russian arms control experts agree on this. At the same time, there is an understanding that reductions should be made in such a manner that, on one hand, Russian nuclear potential was sufficient to deter any adversary in the changing geopolitical circumstances, and, on the other hand, Russia were able to maintain its nuclear arsenal economically.
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