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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Kants
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Something of Hegel's phenomenological method may be conveyed by the first few chapters, which are perhaps among the more conventionally philosophical parts. Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct “shapes of consciousness”—jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge, and from the other, criteria for independent objecthood. In chapter 1, the attitude of “sense-certainty” takes immediately given singular perceptual contents—the sort of role played by “sense data” in some early twentieth-century approaches to epistemology, for example—as the fundamental objects known. By following this form of consciousness's attempts to make these implicit criteria explicit, we are meant to appreciate that any such contents, even the apparently most “immediate” ones, in fact contain implicit conceptually articulated presuppositions, and so, in Hegel's terminology, are “mediated.” One might compare Hegel's point here to that expressed by Kant in his well known claim that without concepts, those singular and immediate mental representations he calls “intuitions” are “blind.” In more recent terminology one might talk of the “concept-” or “theory-ladenness” of all experience, and the lessons of this chapter have been likened to that of Wilfrid Sellars's famous criticism of the “myth of the given.”
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Hegel gained most from intellectual exchanges with his famous room-mates Hölderlin and Schelling. From Hölderlin he learned to love the old Greeks even more, as the quasi-Kantian theology of his teachers bored him more and more. Schelling joined these new ideas. They all protested against the political and ecclesiastical inertia of their home State, and formulated new doctrines of freedom and reason.
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Hegel attended the seminary at T�bingen with the epic poet Friedrich H�lderlin and the objective idealist philosopher Friedrich Schelling. The three watched the unfolding of the French Revolution and collaborated in a critique of the idealist philosophies of Kant and his follower Fichte.
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In his discussion of "Spirit" in his Encyclopedia, Hegel praises Aristotle's On the Soul as "by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic" (par. 378). And in his Phenomenology of Spirit and his Science of Logic, Hegel's concern with Kantian topics such as freedom and morality, and with their ontological implications, is pervasive. Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature, Hegel aims to subsume it within "true infinity," the "Concept" (or "Notion": Begriff), "Spirit," and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible (as mentioned above), rather than remaining a brute "given."
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Hegel was fascinated by the works of Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, and Goethe, and by the French Revolution. Modern philosophy, culture, and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and other, freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Hegel's main philosophical project was to take these contradictions and tensions and interpret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, rational unity that, in different contexts, he called "the absolute idea" or "absolute knowledge".
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Hegel's Science of Logic, the three constituent "books" of which appeared in 1812, 1813, and 1816 respectively, is a work that few contemporary logicians would recognise as a work of logic. It is rather more within the line of investigation found in the "transcendental deduction of the categories" in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant attempted to "deduce" a list of those concepts, the "categories" which are universal and necessary for the thought of finite, discursive knowers.
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